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Reemergence of Ebola Virus in Africa
Members of the family Filoviridae, which cur-
rently consists of Ebola and Marburg viruses, cause
severe and often fatal hemorrhagic fevers in humans
and nonhuman primates. The recent isolation and
identification of a new Ebola virus from a single
nonfatal human case in Côte d’Ivoire (1) and the
more recent outbreak of Ebola hemorrhagic fever in
and around Kikwit, Zaire (2, 3), have raised concerns
about the public health threat of these human patho-
gens. Filoviruses are classified as biosafety level 4
agents because of the extreme pathogenicity of cer-
tain strains and the lack of a protective vaccine or
effective antiviral drug. Moreover, filoviruses are
among the most mysterious groups of viruses known
because their natural history and reservoirs remain
undefined and their pathogenesis is poorly under-
stood.
Ebola virus infections were first recognized in
1976, when simultaneous but separate outbreaks of
human disease caused by two distinct virus subtypes
erupted in northern Zaire and southern Sudan (4)
and resulted in hundreds of deaths. The Zaire sub-
type of Ebola virus had a higher case-fatality, nearly
90%, while the Sudan subtype had a case-fatality
rate of approximately 50%. Before 1995, the last
identified outbreak of Ebola disease in Africa oc-
curred in 1979, when the Sudan subtype of Ebola
virus infected 34 persons (5). In late 1989, in Reston,
Virginia, a novel Ebola virus infected a colony of
cynomolgus macaques that had been imported from
the Philippines (6). The new virus, named Reston
virus, was shown by researchers at the Centers for
disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to be antigeni-
cally and genetically distinct from the African Ebola
viruses, yet despite its high pathogenicity for nonhu-
man primates, it did not appear to cause disease in
humans. Several persons who handled the infected
animals developed antibody to Ebola virus but
showed no signs of disease; one of these persons was
infected while performing an autopsy on an animal
that had died of a Reston virus infection. In 1992, a
repeat of the 1989 Reston episode occurred in Siena,
Italy when macaques were received from the same
Philippine exporter; no evidence of a human infec-
tion was found (7). The new Ebola virus recently
isolated from a patient in the Côte d’Ivoire has been
shown to be genetically distinct from previous Ebola
isolates (A. Sanchez, unpublished data) and is the
first evidence of Ebola virus in West Africa.
Investigations of these outbreaks, as well as of
those caused by Marburg viruses, have yet to pro-
duce any substantial evidence for the natural reser-
voir(s) of filoviruses. Filoviruses do not persist in
experimentally infected nonhuman primates; there-
fore, nonhuman primates are likely not the natural
reservoir. Like humans, these species probably are
infected when direct or indirect contact is made with
the natural host.
The recent news of a large Ebola outbreak in
Kikwit, Zaire, alarmed a worldwide audience al-
ready sensitized by an array of books, magazine
articles, television programs, and movies dealing
with the danger of Ebola virus disease. The public
concern is underscored by the potential for the
spread of these viruses to far regions of the world as
a result of international commerce and jet travel.
The Kikwit outbreak was similar to the original 1976
episode in Zaire, which was centered around the
small village of Yambuku some 1000 km to the north
(8). As in the 1976 outbreak, secondary transmission
of the virus in Kikwit occurred through close per-
sonal contact with infectious blood and other body
fluids and was facilitated by the lack of modern
medical facilities and medical supplies that could
protect those giving care to the initially affected
patients. The chief difference between the Yambuku
episode and this year’s outbreak is that Kikwit is a
large and densely populated center close to larger
cities, such as Kinshasa and Brazzaville, and the
potential for communitywide transmission and
spread to neighboring areas is greater. Retrospective
case surveillance suggests that the index case may
have been a charcoal maker that worked in the forest
outside Kikwit. Human to human transmission oc-
curred without being recognized until the end of
April 1995. Ebola hemorrhagic fever was suspected
when nosocomial infections in the surgical teams
and the nursing staff followed repeated laparotomies
on an infected laboratory technician in Kikwit Gen-
eral Hospital. Specimens were send to CDC through
the Tropical Institute of Antwerpen (Belgium).
Teams of experts from CDC, the World Health Or-
ganization, Belgium, France, South Africa, and Swe-
den traveled to the region to assist in implementing
safe patient care, management, and containment of
the Ebola virus outbreak. As of July 1, 1995, 233
deaths had been reported among the 293 cases.
Rapid diagnosis and characterization of Ebola
virus was performed at CDC in Atlanta on blood
specimens from 14 patients received on May 9. Nine
hours after the specimens had been delivered to
CDC, Ebola virus antigen and/or antibody to this
virus was confirmed in specimens from 13 of the
patients. Four hours later, reverse transcriptase-po-
lymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) assays targeting
conserved regions of filovirus polymerase or Ebola
virus glycoprotein genes each detected Ebola virus
RNA in 12 of the patients. Subsequent analysis of the
genetic profile of the virus was especially important
to understanding the epidemiology of the Kikwit
outbreak. Within 48 hours of receiving the speci-
mens, sequence analysis on the PCR DNA (528 bp)
amplified from the glycoprotein gene derived from
four different patients showed that the Ebola virus
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1976 strain in four bases (<1%). No differences were
seen when the polymerase gene PCR products (~350
bp) from those four patients were sequenced, which
indicated that they had been infected with the same
virus. Three days later, sequence data from ex-
panded analysis of the entire glycoprotein gene were
compared with those of the original 1976 Yambuku
isolate (9) and showed that the overall difference
between these Ebola viruses was less than 1.6%.
Such little change in viruses that caused outbreaks
of disease at extreme ends of Zaire separated by a
span of nearly 19 years, may indicate that the
genomes of Ebola viruses (and filoviruses in general)
are unusually stable and have evolved to occupy
special niches in the wild.
The capability to rapidly diagnose and charac-
terize filovirus infections is critical to the ability of
public health professionals to identify and limit the
spread of future outbreaks of filovirus disease. A
continued commitment to research and modern dis-
ease-surveillance programs is necessary to minimize
or preclude filovirus outbreaks similar to that in
Kikwit. The possibility of outbreaks is increasingly
likely given the continued human incursions into the
African forests and the vulnerability of large impov-
erished populations to rapid transmission of disease
as a result of inadequate public health services. With
the current outbreak under control, CDC and col-
laborators have begun their efforts to identify the
natural reservoir by sending teams of scientists to
collect specimens from the area where the putative
index patient worked. Attempts to identify the res-
ervoir after outbreaks in 1976 and 1979 were handi-
capped by the lack of satisfactory diagnostic tools
that are critical to detecting small quantities of the
virus. However, now that sensitive enzyme immu-
noassays and PCR assays have been developed for
filoviruses, the chances are much better that, if ap-
propriate materials can be collected in the field, the
virus can be detected.
In conclusion, we want to alert physicians and
public health agencies who encounter persons that
have clinical signs and symptoms of hemorrhagic
fever disease to the reemergence of Ebola virus.
Recommendations for the management of viral hem-
orrhagic fevers attributable to filoviruses in the
United States were recently published in CDC’s Mor-
bidity and Mortality Weekly Report (1995;44:475-79).
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Prospects for the Control of Bolivian
Hemorrhagic Fever
Bolivian hemorrhagic fever (BHF) was first iden-
tified in 1959 as a sporadic hemorrhagic illness in
rural areas of Beni department, Bolivia. Clusters of
BHF patients were noted the same year, and by 1962
BHF was recognized as a new epidemic infectious
disease. In 1963, Machupo virus (a member of the
family Arenaviridae) was first isolated from patients
with acute hemorrhagic fever in San Joaquin, Bo-
livia (1). Ecologic investigations established the ro-
dent Calomys callosus, which is indigenous to the
disease-endemic region of northern Bolivia, as the
reservoir for Machupo virus (2,3).
Machupo virus infection in C. callosus results in
asymptomatic infection with shedding of virus in
saliva, urine, and feces; 50% of experimentally in-
fected C. callosus are chronically viremic and shed
virus in their bodily excretions or secretions (2).
Although the infectious dose of Machupo virus in
humans is unknown, exposed persons may become
infected by inhaling virus shed in aerosolized secre-
tions or excretions of infected rodents, by eating food
contaminated with rodent excreta, or by direct con-
tact of excreta with abraded skin or oropharyngeal
mucous membranes (4). Reports of person-to-person
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